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Executive summary 
This study, the first part of a wider analysis on the European Parliament's role in EU 
budgetary powers, traces the very first phase of interinstitutional relations in the 
framework of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). After a brief historical 
introduction, the study explains the structure, objectives and means of action of the ECSC. 
The ECSC Treaty had a number of original features. Among these was the establishment of 
a High Authority, an independent supranational executive with extensive powers 
including the capacity to raise funds via a tax (levy) on coal and steel production, to 
borrow on the capital markets, and to make loans to enterprises. The Treaty also defined 
the respective roles of the ECSC’s Council of Ministers, Common Assembly and Court of 
Justice.  
The ECSC Treaty did not foresee a budgetary procedure: all competences were 
concentrated in the High Authority, which presented an annual report on its activities to 
the Assembly. 
The High Authority was the motor for managing the production of coal and steel, which 
belonged to the ECSC and not to its member states, and for supporting the modernisation 
of the industry and of the social conditions of the workers.   
The present research will highlight a narrative differing in part from the theory of the rules 
of the ECSC Treaty, and we will discover numerous features which, in spite of the 60-year 
gap, point up certain similarities with approaches and problems existing today. 
The autonomy of the High Authority was mitigated by constant consultation/prior 
agreement with the Council of Ministers. The Assembly gained influence over the years, in 
some case obliging  the High Authority to modify decisions already taken, even without a 
specific role being defined in the Treaty. The High Authority introduced multiannual 
budgetary planning, which was more efficient than annual budgets, and exceptionally 
allowed a rebate on the levy for two countries. During the 1980s, the member states 
increased their influence over the ECSC budget (with a direct contribution based on a 
mechanism similar to GNI). The High Authority, in view of the cost of production in some 
countries, decided to introduce a rebate on the levy. It was critical of the way the 
Assembly’s plenary was organised. 
The study concludes with an overview of the evolution of interinstitutional relations, with 
a focus on the budgetary domain and on the capacity of the institutions to adapt and 
evolve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study, entitled ‘History of budgetary powers and politics in the EU – The European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1952-2002’ is the first part of a series which will analyse 
interinstitutional relations in the budgetary domain, with a particular focus on the 
evolution of the role of the European Parliament. 
The budget of the ECSC, as in the case of most organisations, is the crossroads of policies, 
politics and conflicts. The institutional implications of the conflicts and achievements 
contribute to a better understanding not only of the story of this period but also of the 
subsequent developments in European integration. 
The ECSC was a very interesting laboratory in which to test the integration capacity of 
industry, among other issues. The Founding Fathers were willing to engage in this process 
only as a first step towards a more ambitious integration process. Was this approach 
successful? This is one of the questions that the study will try to answer.  
The ECSC had several specific features – autonomy of the executive, a fiscal mechanism, 
and the capacity to contract loans and lend money. Why were these mechanisms not 
replicated in the European Community? 
This study approaches the institutional problems surrounding budgetary decisions and 
control mechanisms, with a particular focus on the Assembly, which, according to the 
Treaties, had only a marginal role. Nevertheless, we can observe an evolution in the role of 
the Assembly, which made its institutional presence visible and, over time, built up a role 
giving it the capacity to influence important decisions. To what extent did the struggles of 
the Assembly of the ECSC influence the subsequent Treaties? 
It would have been impossible to look at the institutional relations, budgetary powers and 
democracy of the Institutions without understanding the historical moment at which the 
ECSC was developed. Focusing on particular historical landmarks helps to understand the 
subsequent evolution of European policy. 
Last but not least, the study attempts to highlight the modernity of the ECSC, as the 
solutions found for certain problems are in some cases very close to debates of decades 
later. 
To conclude, this study is an overview of the beginning of the post-war adventure 
launched by a small number of visionary statesmen, involving public opinion. The ECSC 
budget played a central role in supporting the integration process and achieving the 
objectives of the ECSC, such as the modernisation of industry and, in parallel, support for 
social housing. The role of the Assembly helped to make public opinion more aware of the 
advantages but also of the problems of European integration, and to make the ECSC more 
visible. 
Please note that this study is also aimed at non-experts, to help them understand not only 
the past but also the foundations for future developments. 
7

CHAPTER  I  
ECSC - THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
It is not our intention to present a complete historical overview. Many important studies 
and books already exist, often based on the original documents held in the archives of 
various institutions.  It nevertheless seems useful to recall, very succinctly, some of the key 
moments and actors that contributed to influencing the follow-up of events.  
The Congress of Europe meets in The Hague, Netherlands on 7-11 May, 1948. The meeting is chaired by Winston 
Churchill and attended by 800 delegates. © European Union, 1940-1949 
 
The post-war phase 
After the destruction of the war, various events contributed to create the conditions which 
favoured the launch of the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950. 
Among many other elements, we may mention: a) the Hague Conference of May 1948, 
which brought together numerous political leaders to discuss Europe; b) the London 
Conference of June 1948, which established severe conditions for German autonomy; and 
c) the Petersberg Conference, which allowed Germany to regain part of its sovereignty. 
The Hague Conference, organised in May 19481 by the European Movement, gathered 
for the first time a number of political leaders, not in a formal summit but in the first 
                                                                 
1 http://www.cvce.eu/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/04bfa990-86bc-402f-a633-11f39c9247c4 
9
European forum to discuss a revolutionary project. Two different ideas of Europe 
(Federalism vs Confederalism) were already being intensely discussed, but all participants 
were animated by the same spirit, namely the desire to build up solid links between states 
in order to consolidate the peace and avoid a new war situation. 
Winston Churchill’s speech was considered one of the highlights of the Hague Conference. 
Churchill fully played his role of natural leader, thanks not only to his contribution to the 
military defeat of Nazism and Fascism but also to the vision he was able to present as 
leader of the British United Europe Movement. Churchill2 enthusiastically declared that, in 
the vital interest of Europe and the world at that dark hour, ‘a spark would start a fire 
which would glow brighter and stronger in the hearts and minds of men and women in 
many lands’. 
Beyond speeches and declarations, the Hague Conference was crucial because it allowed 
political leaders to meet and build up respect, mutual understanding, and in some cases, 
friendship. This was true for many, and in particular for the mayor of Cologne who headed 
the German delegation, namely Konrad Adenauer.  
At the end of the Hague Conference, a public rally was organised in Dam Square in 
Amsterdam to support the idea of a united Europe and to involve public opinion in 
supporting this idea.  
The London Conference3, held in June 1948, placed severe limits on Germany’s 
sovereignty. Demilitarisation was confirmed, under the control of the Military Office for 
Security, but at the same time solid links with the West were formed. The western part of 
Germany could benefit from aids under the European Recovery Plan prepared by the 
OEEC4. A special status for the Ruhr was defined, with the control of coal and steel 
production and exports being placed under an International Authority. The reconstruction 
of the industry was definitely one of the major problems in all European countries: coal 
and steel were the key sectors for reconstruction, and the Ruhr was under the control of 
the Allies, who exploited it with the intention to recover funds to pay back their war 
efforts. The results of the London Conference, while accepted by the Federal Government, 
led by Konrad Adenauer, were heavily criticised by the SPD leader, Kurt Schumacher. 
The Petersberg Agreement5 was a crucial step for the construction of Europe, as it 
allowed Germany to regain part of its sovereignty and reinforced the credibility of 
Chancellor Adenauer. Under pressure from the British government6, the Allies were ready 
                                                                 
2 An extract from Churchill’s speech may be found at:  http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu01621/discours-
de-winston-churchill-au-congres-de-l-europe-de-la-haye.html 
3 The London Six-Power Conference in 1948 was held between the US, the UK, France and the Benelux countries. The 
conference was held in two sessions, the first from 23 February to 6 March, the second from 20 April to 2 June 1948. The 
final communiqué of this conference (London, 28 December 1948) may be found at: 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/communique_final_de_la_conference_des_six_puissances_chargee_d_etablir_l_autorite_inter
nationale_de_la_ruhr_londres_28_decembre_1948-fr-b0eb504f-8263-4b4f-b539-9c911f247f7e.html 
4 http://www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm 
5 See: German History in documents and images, Volume 8. Occupation and the Emergence of Two States, 1945-1961 - 
The Petersberg Agreement (22 November 1949) - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/pdf/eng/Founding%208%20ENG.pdf 
6 See the Message from the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, to his French counterpart, Robert Schuman, in which 
he proposed reconsidering the Allies’ dismantling policy in the occupied zones. Source: Beyer, Henry, Robert Schuman, 
L’Europe par la réconciliation franco-allemande, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe,  
Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1986 (Cahiers rouges). 
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Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1986 (Cahiers rouges). 
to accept a new role for West Germany - even with some resistance from France -  on the 
international scene. In particular, West Germany was enabled to:  
• become an associate member of the Council of Europe; 
• be involved in the decisions of the International Authority for the Ruhr; 
• benefit from aid under the Marshall Plan;  
• engage in international trade and establish consular relations with other countries; 
• revise the industrial dismantling programme, removing some industrial plants 
from the list. 
In exchange, West Germany agreed to follow the principles of liberty, tolerance and 
humanity and to prevent any revival of totalitarian tendencies. 
 
After 9 May 1950 (The Schuman Declaration) 
The Schuman Declaration7 came as a shock to diplomatic circles: the Benelux countries 
asked for clarification, while Ernest Bevin called the French ambassador; the US and Italy 
gave a positive reaction to the plan8.  The key quotes were: 
• ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts 
proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.’ 
• ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ 
• ‘The pooling of coal and steel production [...] will change the destinies of those 
regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of 
which they have been the most constant victims.’ 
The days that followed were decisive for defining the start of the negotiations. The 
Benelux countries, Italy and Germany declared their support for the proposals and their 
intention to participate in the negotiation phase, while a diplomatic struggle began 
between the Quai d’Orsay and the UK Foreign Office9. The latter rejected the idea of 
pooling coal and steel production and creating a High Authority 10. At the same time, the 
UK was aware of the possible implications and proposed joining the negotiations with a 
special status. The six other countries rejected this. 
About two months later, in August 1950, the British delegates to the Council of Europe 
advanced a new counter-proposal for an intergovernmental body, but this only obtained 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/message_for_monsieur_schuman_from_mr_bevin-en-0fc42bca-95ef-4f07-bf54-
2c23d3e015a2.html - publication date: 13 September 2012. 
7 Full text: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm 
8 Cf: Wilkens, Andreas, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire: Intérêts nationaux et projet européen. Organisation 
internationale et relations internationales : 58, Bruylant, Brussels, 2004 (overview and historical interpretations of 
reactions to the Schuman Declaration). 
9 For the reactions in the various capitals, see: http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-
4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023/86a47d71-5295-4f9b-a12b-6246dcb99b24 
10 For the acute diplomatic context, see: http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-
b6db-f5f9e6c01023/9f64d11c-0f79-4eeb-983d-b2700fc62cfd 
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the support of the Scandinavian countries. The operational phase for the negotiation and 
signature of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty had started. 
 
The political leadership 
The last part of this introduction to the interinstitutional relations on the financing of the 
ECSC is devoted to the aspect of political leadership. The historical moment was definitely 
not easy: the war was over but confidence and trust were at their lowest level. On the 
positive side, the perspective of a radical change which could open a period for peace 
gained the support of public opinion. The choice of coal and steel was crucial for the 
strategic role of this industry during the war, for the particular management of the 
German industry, run by the Allies, and for the need to establish a monitoring mechanism 
for all European coal and steel industries. 
Some positive elements were, though, not sufficient to build up a European community 
with transfer of sovereignty and pooling of strategic resources. This titanic task could only 
be achieved with the strong political leadership of a number of politicians in the different 
countries. This is definitely not the place to write biographies,11 but it is important even in 
this context to honour and remember, with a few phrases, some of the Founding Fathers, 
since without their commitment the European adventure would probably not have 
begun. 
 
Jean Monnet  
Jean Monnet12 was not a professional politician: he was more of a businessman and a great 
manager, used to getting things done. He had vision and the capacity to inspire people. 
The best way to describe him is to quote him.  
Monnet’s approach to solving problems: ‘Quand les hommes sont assis autour de la même 
table pour parler du même problème et pour en chercher ensemble la solution, leur 
mentalité change, les oppositions s’effacent.’ 
Monnet’s vision: ‘Je ne voyais qu’un remède, nous lier sans retour avec l’Allemagne dans 
une entreprise solidaire à laquelle nos autres voisins se joindraient. Ainsi serait créé un 
grand espace européen de prospérité et de paix.’ 
Robert Schuman 
Robert Schuman was a ‘politician by accident not by vocation’13 but nonetheless served 
across his career in France as city councillor, member of the National Assembly, Finance 
Minister, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. He was also the first President of the 
European Parliament. However, Schuman was averse to speaking with journalists and to 
drawing attention to himself.  The essence of this great statesman, a man both simple and 
profound, is summed up in the following quotations, from Belgian Minister of Foreign 
                                                                 
11 There are numerous biographies of the Founding Fathers. One of the most recent, rich in references, is Europe, a Leap 
into the Unknown by Victoria Martín de la Torre (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2014 - ISBN 978-2-87574-173-8). 
12 References to Monnet are from the website of the Jean Monnet Foundation: http://jean-monnet.ch/ 
13 Martín de la Torre, op. cit., p. 72. 
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Affairs  Paul-Henri Spaak and Hendrik Brugmans, Rector of the College of Europe in 
Bruges14. 
Paul-Henri Spaak: ‘Schuman seemed shy, hesitant, his eloquence had nothing seductive in 
it, he never sought to impose himself, to command, and yet it was when he had charge 
and power, that France was really at the head of Europe and that the great idea of a 
supranational Europe really made progress.’ 
Hendrik Brugmans: ‘The hours we spent in personal conversation were the most precious 
to me. There you could see that this politician is not only a statesman but a man whose 
power is created out of the wealth and depth of his universal spiritual life -- for here the 
word “Europe” is too small. Rooted in his own homeland he is a Lorraine European. But he 
is much more: a humanitarian, a humanist -- a real human being (ein Menschenfreund, ein 
Mitmensch - ein Mensch).’  
Konrad Adenauer  
Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1963). 
In the six years 1949-1955 Adenauer realised far-reaching foreign policy goals, to gain the 
trust of the Allies and allow Germany to obtain a new sovereignty,  and to bind Germany’s 
future in with the Western alliance. This led to German membership of the Council of 
Europe (1951), the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and 
Germany’s entry into NATO (1955). Adenauer changed the face of post-war German and 
European history more than any other individual.15 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speaking at the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of 
Adenauer’s death, summarised some of his achievements: ‘The democracy in which we 
Germans live today, in unity and liberty, rose up from the foundations which Konrad 
Adenauer helped to create, and which, indeed, he was instrumental in shaping. The 
German Basic Law, formulated under his chairmanship of the Parliamentary Council, has 
been an outstanding success over the decades; it has proved capable of accommodating 
new developments, and today - having been modified only slightly - continues to provide 
a sound platform for a unified Germany. And finally, the unified Europe towards which we 
are working is being built in accordance with the plan that Konrad Adenauer drew up 
together with his European partners; together with them he created the foundation walls 
and the supporting pillars’.16 
Alcide De Gasperi 
Alcide De Gasperi played a crucial role in Italy’s reconstruction, as Prime Minister from 
1945 to 1953. He was convinced that Italy’s reconstruction meant reinforcing links with 
other Western democracies; he was a good mediator between France and Germany and 
contributed to the setting-up of the Council of Europe, as well as persuading Italy to be 
part of the American Marshall Plan and to join NATO - all this at a time when Italy had one 
of the largest Communist parties in Western Europe. 
                                                                 
14 Quotations from the official Robert Schuman website: http://www.schuman.info/ 
15 See also the European Commission’s website: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-
fathers/pdf/konrad_adenauer_en.pdf 
16 Speech on 19 April 1997 in Bad Honnef, Pro Europa, http://pro-
europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28:helmut-kohl-a-speech-on-konrad-adenauer-
&catid=11:the-struggle-for-the-union-of-europe&Itemid=17 
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De Gasperi was elected President of the ECSC Assembly on 11 May 1954. In his inaugural 
speech he defined the perfect role of a democratic parliament: he declared that the 
Assembly should criticise the High Authority, make proposals to it and monitor it – but, as 
he put it, you don’t have to forget the aim of the vision of the construction of peace.17 
Paul-Henri Spaak  
By contrast with Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak was a talented speaker and could 
easily count on the attention of his public. This quality, along with his profound 
convictions and his experience of European construction (Benelux and the ECSC), 
facilitated his appointment as chair of the committee in charge of preparing the EEC 
Treaty. To accelerate this process, he presented a plan on behalf of the Benelux countries 
(the Spaak report) for the integration of the transport and atomic energy sectors. This 
document was one of the bases for the EEC Treaty. As an alternative to the Spaak plan, 
General De Gaulle presented the ‘Fouchet plan’, which firmly opposed any supranational 
elements in the construction of Europe. However, for Spaak ‘the Europe of tomorrow must 
be a supranational Europe’.  
To conclude, political leadership is essential to implement a vision and be at the forefront 
of change.  
                                                                 
17 Address of the President Alcide De Gasperi, Debates of the Common Assembly, sitting of Tuesday, 11 May 1954. 
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CHAPTER II  
THE ECSC TREATY 
 
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 18 between the 
Benelux countries, France, Germany and Italy, was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 and 
entered into force on 23 July 1952, with a period of validity limited to 50 years. The Treaty 
expired on 23 July 2002. The aim of the Treaty was to organise the free movement of coal 
and steel and free access to the sources of production. Responsibility for its 
implementation was assigned to a High Authority, composed of nine members19 chosen 
for their competence. There were no predetermined national quotas, and the Treaty 
stated that the Authority could not have more than two members of the same nationality. 
The High Authority was independent of the Member States and was entrusted with the 
tasks of supervising the market and guaranteeing respect for competition rules and price 
transparency.  
 
Objectives  
The aim of the Treaty 20, as stated in its Article 2, was to contribute, through the common 
market for coal and steel, to economic expansion, higher employment and a rising 
standard of living. Thus, the institutions had to ensure an orderly supply to the common 
market by ensuring equal access to the sources of production, the establishment of the 
lowest prices and improved working conditions. All of this was to be accompanied by 
growth in international trade and modernisation of production. 
In the light of the establishment of the common market, the Treaty introduced the free 
movement of coal and steel products without custom duties or taxes. It prohibited 
discriminatory measures or practices, subsidies, aids granted by states or special charges 
imposed by states, and restrictive practices. 
 
Tasks 
Contrary to other, ‘classical’ international organisations, the ECSC was funded not by 
national contributions but by levies on coal and steel production (a sort of European tax in 
the coal and steel sector) and by contracting loans. The levies were intended to cover 
administrative expenditure: the funds received from borrowing could only be used to 
grant loans. 
The tasks of the ECSC, as managed by the High Authority, may be summarised in the 
following activities: 
                                                                 
18 The full text of the ECSC Treaty is at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11951K/TXT&from=EN 
19 ECSC Treaty, Articles 8-19. Article 9 did not state who should appoint the members of the High Authority. 
20 An extended summary of the ECSC Treaty may be found at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1413975955971&uri=URISERV:xy0022 
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• The ECSC could grant loans and guarantee loans contracted by undertakings. It 
could also grant financial aid to alleviate the negative effects of technological 
advances in the industry on the workforce. 
 
• The High Authority, in the event of any decline or increase of demand, could take 
direct action by imposing quotas with the aim of limiting or pushing up 
production, establishing consumption priorities, determining the allocation of 
resources, and setting export levels. 
 
• The High Authority had the task of monitoring discrimination as regards prices, 
unfair competitive practices and discriminatory practices, e.g. abnormally low 
wages or discrimination in the area of free movement of workers. 
 
• The ECSC had the power to set maximum and minimum rates for customs duties 
and to supervise the granting of import and export licences.  
 
• The coal and steel industries had the obligation to keep the High Authority 
informed of commercial agreements. 
 
With a view to achieving its objectives, the High Authority had means of information, 
powers of consultation and the power to make checks. In the event that undertakings did 
not respect these powers, it could impose fines (maximum of 1 % of annual turnover) and 
penalty payments (5 % of average daily turnover for each day’s delay). 
 
Structure 
The Treaty set up the structure of the ECSC, establishing a High Authority, an Assembly, a 
Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The Community had legal personality. 
The High Authority was the independent collegiate executive with the task of 
implementing  the objectives set by the Treaty and acting in the general interest of the 
Community.  
The Treaty also included two protocols, one on the Court of Justice and the other on 
relations of the ECSC with the Council of Europe, as well as a convention on the 
transitional provisions, which dealt with the implementation of the Treaty, relations with 
third countries and general safeguards. 
The High Authority 21 was a truly supranational body with powers of decision. Decisions 
were taken by a majority of members, and it was assisted by a Consultative Committee22 
composed of 30 to 51 members and representing producers, workers, consumers and 
dealers of the two sectors.  
The Council consisted of one representative from each national government. The 
Presidency of the Council was held by each Member State in turn for a period of three 
                                                                 
21 ECSC Treaty, Articles 9 to 16. 
22 ECSC Treaty, Articles 18 and 19. 
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21 ECSC Treaty, Articles 9 to 16. 
22 ECSC Treaty, Articles 18 and 19. 
months. The role of the Council was to harmonise the activities of the High Authority with 
the general economic policy of the governments. Its approval was required for all 
important decisions taken by the High Authority. The Assembly was made up of 
78 deputies23, who were representatives of the national parliaments, and had supervisory 
powers under the Treaty. 
The Court of Justice, made up of seven judges appointed for six years by common 
agreement between the governments of the Member States, ensured that the law was 
observed in the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty. 
The ECSC Treaty also set up24 a Committee, composed of the four Presidents of the ECSC 
institutions and chaired by the President of the Court of Justice, which acted as the 
budgetary authority (see below).  
The ECSC was funded by levies on coal and steel production and by contracting loans (see 
below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECSC Headquarters in Luxembourg. © European Union, 1960-1969 
 
Some considerations25 
The objectives of the ECSC were certainly ambitious but were nevertheless limited to two 
economic sectors, while its structure was relatively complex. This situation can be 
                                                                 
23 The breakdown of membership of the Assembly was as follows: 18 each for Germany, France and Italy; 10 each for 
Belgium and the Netherlands; 4 for Luxembourg. 
24 ECSC Treaty, Article 78. 
25 See also: Reuter, Paul, La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (with a preface by Robert Schuman), Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1953; Kapteyn, P J. G., L’assemblée commune de la Communauté européenne 
du charbon et de l’acier: un essai de parlementarisme européen, A.W. Sythoff, Leyden (Netherlands), 1962. 
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explained by the vision and dynamism of the Schuman Plan: the six delegations 
participating to the negotiation of the Treaty were aware that this was only the first step in 
a long-term process.  
At the same time, the Treaty framed the activities and the competences of the High 
Authority. These limitations can be read as embodying the desire of certain Member 
States to limit the autonomy of the High Authority. 
The Treaty also determined when the Consultative Committee and the Council of 
Ministers had to be consulted. In some cases consultation of the latter was compulsory; in 
others no decision could be taken against the Council26. However, the reality was 
somewhat different, as the High Authority consulted the Council even when it was not 
legally obliged to. In fact the Council of Ministers became a sort of second advisory body. 
Thus ‘comitology’ was born. 
This approach of the High Authority was accentuated after the rejection of the European 
Defence Community Treaty. The High Authority understood that Member States were 
reluctant to abandon their sovereignty and considered it more prudent to err on the side 
of excess as regards consultation. This provoked a reaction from the Assembly, which 
wanted to expand its role. 
The creation of the Assembly was the result of a number of conflicting ideas between the 
negotiating delegations. Some wanted to introduce a form of democratic element in the 
structure of the ECSC, motivated by the long-term vision to build up a federal state. The 
possibility of direct election to the Assembly was also referred to in the Treaty.  
Others supported the idea of the creation of an Assembly in order to introduce additional 
political control over the High Authority. Last but not least, the Treaty provided for the 
political accountability of the High Authority vis-à-vis the Assembly: the latter could adopt 
a motion of censure27 which would oblige the High Authority to resign. 
The power of the Assembly to introduce a motion of censure was nevertheless limited by a 
number of conditions. The two-thirds majority required for adoption of the motion, the 
limitation of the motion to the Annual Report, the provision that the High Authority would 
have to resign en bloc, the absence of influence over the appointment of the new High 
Authority, were all elements that deterred the political groups from tabling such a motion. 
The Socialist group was critical towards the policy of the High Authority but never fulfilled 
the conditions to table a successful motion. 
As a conclusion to this introduction some reflections may be made: 
• the ECSC Treaty certainly helped shape the model of the future EU Institutions; 
• in spite of the strong supranational character of the High Authority, Member States 
had a strong influence on its decisions, even where there were no Treaty 
provisions as such; 
• the role of the Assembly was important but at the same time limited; 
• the Members of the Assembly started from the very beginning to increase their 
influence not only on technical issues but also on the political activities of the 
ECSC. 
                                                                 
26 For the ‘avis conforme’ (assent) procedure,  see ECSC Treaty, Articles 53-55, 58, 66, 74 and 88. 
27 For the motion of censure, see ECSC Treaty, Article  24. 
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26 For the ‘avis conforme’ (assent) procedure,  see ECSC Treaty, Articles 53-55, 58, 66, 74 and 88. 
27 For the motion of censure, see ECSC Treaty, Article  24. 
 
Summing up, in spite of the autonomy and independence of the High Authority, in 
practice: a) Member States did whatever was possible to exert their influence; b) the 
Assembly did the maximum to exert a more active democratic control over the High 
Authority. This situation limited the power of the High Authority, which was then obliged 
to mediate and seek compromises. 
The speech delivered in plenary 28 by Juan Colom i Naval introducing the report of 
Parliament on the incorporation of the ECSC into the budget of the European Union in 
November 1996 is a useful summary of the specificity and the achievements of that Treaty. 
                                                                 
28 Debate of the European Parliament of 14 November 1996, No 4-490/243. 
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CHAPTER III  
 THE ECSC ASSEMBLY: HOW DID IT GAIN INFLUENCE 
 
This part will outline the role of the Common Assembly and show how it gained respect 
and influence beyond the strict Treaty provisions. The Assembly made a major 
contribution to shaping and strengthening the role of the future European Parliament 
under the Treaty of Rome.  
 
The Assembly: starting from a marginal role  
The ECSC Treaty devotes a chapter to the Assembly 29. As regards aspects other than its 
composition, the competences of the Assembly were limited. They can be summarised as 
follows:  
a. The Assembly received the annual General Report of the High Authority 30 and held 
a debate on it. The Treaty was silent on the possible follow-up of this debate and 
on whether the Assembly had to approve the report  or make recommendations; 
b. The Assembly could vote on and adopt a motion of censure31 on the High Authority 
should such a motion be tabled. To be adopted, a motion of censure had to be 
passed by a two-thirds majority and a majority of Members. This was a strong 
deterrent32: the Socialist Group on some occasions threatened to table a motion, 
but could not secure the majority required. Another limitation was the Assembly’s 
lack of any influence over the appointment of the members of the new High 
Authority. Even should a motion of censure have been adopted, in theory the 
Council could reappoint exactly the same individuals to the Authority, 
uninfluenced by the Assembly. 
c. The Assembly prepared its own draft estimates and participated33 through its 
President in the Committee of the Four Presidents (see above, note 23) in their 
approval. It also received the report of the Auditor. 
d. Finally, the provision existed for any modifications to the Treaty, after adoption by 
the High Authority and the Council with the approval of the Court of Justice, to be 
sent to the Assembly for final approval34. 
Further to its ordinary sessions, the Assembly was empowered to hold extraordinary 
plenary sessions, on the request of a majority of its Members or of the Council. The 
members of both the High Authority and the Council had the right to be present at all 
                                                                 
29 ECSC Treaty, Articles 21-25. 
30 ECSC Treaty, Article 24. 
31 ECSC Treaty, Article 24(2). 
32 See also Kapteyn, p. 176. 
33 ECSC Treaty, Article 78. 
34 ECSC Treaty, Article 95. Approval required a three-fourths majority vote and a two-thirds majority of the Assembly’s 
component Members. 
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plenary sessions. The right of the Assembly to raise questions applied only to the High 
Authority. 
Finally, a decision of the Assembly could be annulled by the Court of Justice following a 
request by a Member State, but the Assembly did not have the power to introduce a 
similar request to annul a decision of one of the other institutions.  
 
The Assembly expands its influence 
The Common Assembly could not accept a merely virtual role, and began to make use of 
all possible parliamentary techniques. The fact that most of its members were national 
parliamentarians made for an Assembly rich 
in parliamentary tradition. Further to this, 
many of the appointees were prominent 
personalities, all committed to European 
values. 
In his report on the organisation of the 
Common Assembly 35, Alain Poher stressed 
the greater similarity of the Common 
Assembly to the national parliaments than to 
other international organisations, a 
declaration that in 1955 appeared 
revolutionary to many.  
The development of the Assembly was 
certainly inspired by the report by Pierre-
Henri Teitgen36. Following the adoption of 
that report, a working group was created 
which produced a number of reports that 
contributed to shaping the function and 
activities of the Common Assembly 37.  
Some concrete results were achieved which 
contributed to increase the influence and 
respect of the parliamentary body: 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen, a French delegate and rapporteur 
on the powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly in 
1954. © European Union 
                                                                 
35 Report by Alain Poher, doc. 2, November 1955, p. 10, EP Historical Archives AC AP RP/GRTR.1955 AC-0002/55-
novembre 0010 ; see also statement of 1952 by the Committee of Jurists at the Council of Europe, Introductory Report by 
the Committee of Jurists on the Problem of a European Political Community, Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, 
SG(52)2, Strasbourg, September 1952.  
36 Report by Pierre-Henri Teitgen: ‘The powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly and their use’, doc. 5, November 
1954, EP Historical Archives AC AP RP/RELA.1953 AC-0005/54-novembre 0010 and Historical Archives of the European 
Union. Full text also available at the Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe: 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/teitgen_report_19_november_1954-en-e5e7e6e8-035d-4c40-a04d-6d747a74b198.html  
37 Authors: Poher, on the organisation of the Assembly; Carboni, on relations with international organisations; Fohrmann, 
on the functioning of political groups; Dehousse, on the powers of the Assembly and the revision of the Treaty. 
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a. Cooperation with the High Authority and powers of control over it – The Treaty 
granted the Assembly powers of control on an ex post basis, but Jean Monnet, 
President of the High Authority stated, on the occasion of a speech to the 
Assembly 38, that the High Authority should inform the Assembly more fully on the 
principles behind future projects, should collect its opinions and should be 
expected to know the guidelines. This was taken as encouraging the committees to 
be more proactive in stimulating the flow of information. 
 
b. Ex ante control – This aspect became crucial when, in 1955, the High Authority 
decided, after consulting the Council and obtaining its agreement, to reduce the 
levy without informing the Assembly. The Assembly heavily criticised the High 
Authority, as consultation of the Council was not foreseen by the Treaty: it saw the 
High Authority as having given up its independence. As a result, starting in 1957 
the High Authority consulted the Assembly prior to all decisions on the level of the 
levy. 
 
c. Increase the number of plenary sessions – The Assembly, in order to be efficient 
in its control capacity, increased the number of plenary sessions and limited itself 
to one ordinary session as foreseen in the Treaty. In concrete terms it was proposed 
and accepted to have a constitutive meeting and one extraordinary meeting per 
semester. The Belgian senator Motz39 raised the problem of coordination of work at 
national and European level. 
 
d. Creation of standing committees40 –  To follow up the day-to-day activities of the 
High Authority, and also of the Council and of the Consultative Committee, the 
Assembly called for an improvement in the quality of information, so that it could 
exercise effective control over the High Authority’s activities. Seven committees 
were created by one of the Assembly's first resolutions, in January 1953;41 an eighth 
committee was added in 1956.42 
 
e. Political control – The Teitgen report was very clear on this point: the Assembly 
should exert political and not merely technical control. The Assembly would 
diverge from its mission if it simply followed the technical day-to-day activity of the 
                                                                 
38 Speech by Jean Monnet to the Assembly, Debates of the Common Assembly, 23 June 1953, pp. 184-185. 
39 Stein, Eric, ‘The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of emerging “Political control”‘, International 
Organisation, Vol. 13, No. 2, University of Wisconsin Press, 1959, pp. 233-254, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704391  
40 Piodi, Franco, The Committees of the Common Assembly – Study of the main work of the Committees of the Common 
Assembly of the ECSC between 1952 and 1958, European Parliament, Archive and Documentation Centre, Luxembourg, 
2008. 
41 EP resolution of 10 January 1953, OJ 10.2.1953, pp. 8-9. 
42 Following the Marcinelle disaster, the Committee on Safety and Rescue in Mines was created – see: EP resolution of 30 
November 1956, OJ 12.12.1956, p. 399. 
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High Authority. The control exercised by the Assembly had to be placed on the 
very high level of essential choices. 
 
f. Political presence – This related to the members of the High Authority, who could 
not be replaced by members of their staff, the latter being denied the right to 
speak at public meetings. This approach concerned not only the High Authority 
but also the members of the Council. In 1954, a standing committee asked the 
Council to appear before it. The Council refused, but received a delegation on its 
premises. In 1956, the full Council appeared before the Assembly. 
 
g. Information policy – The Assembly agreed with the rapporteur as regards 
supporting a better and more transparent information policy in order to gain 
awareness and support on the part of public opinion. No political ideal could 
survive without support from public opinion. The High Authority introduced a 
chapter on information policy in the General Report. 
Common market information booth in Strasbourg in the early '60s. © European Union 
 
h. Knowledge and expertise – The Assembly needed to increase its knowledge in 
order to develop a new control role. This gap was to be filled by the forwarding of 
documents of the High Authority and the Consultative Committee and through 
hearings of experts who could be hired for a sort of ‘budgetary expertise’. The 
report contested the restrictive approach of ‘confidential documents’ and asked for 
more transparency when individual or commercial interests were not in danger. 
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Common market information booth in Strasbourg in the early '60s. © European Union 
 
h. Knowledge and expertise – The Assembly needed to increase its knowledge in 
order to develop a new control role. This gap was to be filled by the forwarding of 
documents of the High Authority and the Consultative Committee and through 
hearings of experts who could be hired for a sort of ‘budgetary expertise’. The 
report contested the restrictive approach of ‘confidential documents’ and asked for 
more transparency when individual or commercial interests were not in danger. 
 
i. The Assembly’s decisions – in absence of Treaty provisions, the Assembly defined 
its own modes of action: resolutions, recommendations and opinions. All of these 
contributed to reinforcing its influence. 
 
j. A pragmatic calendar – After the merger of the Treaties in 1965, the calendar of 
the ECSC budgetary procedure was adapted to the calendar of the general budget 
procedure. Even if a formal procedure did not exist, Parliament not only gave its 
opinion on the level of the levy but also commented on the breakdown of 
expenditure, proposing modifications to the distribution of spending. In some 
cases the Commission accepted Parliament’s ‘amendments’. 
 
To conclude, the aspects outlined above testify to the vitality of the Common Assembly 
with regard to both problems and solutions, and show how it increased its influence and 
secured wider respect. This approach proved fundamental in the moment of defining the 
tasks and competences of the European Parliamentary Assembly in the Treaty of Rome. 
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The two first pages of Pierre-Henri Teitgen's handwritten manuscript: a draft report on the Common Assembly's powers 
of control, 1954 – AC AP RP/RELA.1953 AC-0005/54-novembre 0070. 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE ECSC FINANCES 
 
1. The Treaty provisions 
The originalities of the ECSC Treaty included the capacity of the High Authority both to 
impose a levy on the production of coal and steel and to contract loans43. Neither activity 
was allowed by the subsequent EC/EU Treaties.  
 
The levy on coal and steel production: a real own resource 
The ECSC Treaty laid down the financial rules and activities44 which the High Authority 
could develop. The High Authority was empowered with two major tasks which had no 
equivalent in the succeeding EC/EU Treaties: 
- the capacity to fix a levy on production of steel and coal (a genuine European tax); and 
- the capacity to contract loans on the market to re-lend to European enterprises. 
This genuine own resources mechanism, which is the real specificity of the ECSC, gave 
autonomy to the High Authority. The resources from the levy could be used to: 
I. cover administrative expenditure; 
II. provide financial aid for readaptation; 
III. promote research;  
IV. complement financing arrangements, including transfer to a guarantee fund. 
The levy was fixed for each financial year (1 July-30 June)  by the High Authority: the 
Council was consulted only if the level of the levy exceeded 1 %, in which case its 
agreement was mandatory. The Council was also to be consulted on the methodology of 
assessment and collection of the levy. As indicated below, in practical terms the High 
Authority always consulted the Council prior to decision even if this was not actually  
required, and after 1956 even the Assembly was first informed ex post and then consulted 
before the decision. 
The Treaty also assigned to the High Authority the power to impose fines on undertakings 
failing to comply with its decisions. 
 
The borrowing/lending activity 
The High Authority was empowered to borrow on the best possible conditions offered by  
the market and then to concede loans to enterprises for purposes compatible with the 
Treaty, in certain cases subject to the consent of the Council and after obtaining the 
opinion of the Consultative Committee. Over the period from 1952 to 2002 loans were one 
of the most important activities of the ECSC, allowing enterprises to benefit from better 
                                                                 
43 ECSC Treaty, Article 49. 
44 Chapters II (Articles 49-53) and III (Articles 54-56) of the ECSC Treaty deal with financial rules and the activities of the 
ECSC. See also Articles 77 and 78. 
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conditions on the financial markets and favouring their modernisation as well as 
improving the living conditions of workers. Such activities are now forbidden by the 
current Treaties unless carried out by the European Central Bank or the European 
Investment Bank.  The ECSC mechanism of loans is similar to the plan recently presented 
by President Juncker: a guarantee fund (announced to the sum of EUR 21 billion) is 
designed to attract capital (to the sum of EUR 315 billion) which the EIB will then use to 
finance activities to generate competition and jobs.  
 
Procedure for administrative expenditure 
Each of the four institutions established by the Treaty was expected to prepare its own 
draft estimates.45  
The draft estimates of each institution were submitted to the Committee of the four 
Presidents, chaired by the President of the Court of Justice. This Committee acted as the 
budgetary authority for administrative expenditure. Its decisions constituted authorisation 
of expenditure on a basis of respect for budgetary specificity. To change the allocation of 
authorised appropriations, the institution concerned had to make a request for transfer to 
the Committee of Presidents.  
The Council also appointed an auditor. 
 
Reporting by the High Authority on budgetary policy and financial activities 
The ECSC Treaty established46 that the High Authority should publish every year, before 
the opening of the parliamentary term, a ‘General Report on the ECSC’s activities and 
administrative expenditure’. This was the case as the Treaty did not foresee a single 
document grouping all financial activities of one institution (budget), nor did it provide for 
a proper budgetary procedure.  
 
Content of the General Report  
The General Report was a key document for the assessment of the policy and budget of 
the High Authority, above all because it was submitted to the control of the Assembly,47 
which organised a debate at a public sitting. The Treaty did not foresee a vote after this 
debate, but did provide for one on a motion of censure if tabled according to the rules of 
the Treaty. 
The Assembly gave an extensive interpretation of the Treaty 48: the motion could censure 
any activity of the High Authority, not necessarily linked to the General Report, the sole 
limitation being that the motion should be tabled during the debate on the General 
Report. Apart from the practical consequences of this interpretation (no motion of censure 
was never tabled), it is interesting to note the determination of the Assembly to play fully 
                                                                 
45 The High Authority was expected to include expenditure related to the Consultative Committee. 
46 ECSC Treaty, Article 17. 
47 ECSC Treaty, Article 24. 
48 Mutter report, Doc. 1, January 1953 (EP Historical Archives AC AP RP/REGL.1952 AC-0001/53-janvier 0010), and Poher 
report, doc. 2, November 1955, para 23. 
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its role of democratic control over the activities of the High Authority and the Council, 
using all possible instruments to extend its influence. 
The pressure of the Assembly can be noted even in the number of pages dedicated to 
budgetary issues in the General Reports over the years. 
An evolution of the General Reports can be observed over the first five years: it is 
interesting to note that in the General Report of 1953 the part related to investment 
activities and their financing occupied less than 4 pages, while in the fourth General 
Report the first annex on finance appeared and the information was more detailed.  As we 
will see in the following chapter, this is the result of the forcible pressure exerted by the 
Assembly. 
In the fifth report there appeared for the first time a summary of the activities of each 
Institution, as well as a chapter on the Information policy of the High Authority. The fifth 
report was the last to be addressed to the President of the Common Assembly: the sixth 
report (1958) was addressed to the President of the European Parliamentary Assembly, 
this change being stressed in the introduction to that report49: 
‘The High Authority is happy to submit its sixth General Report to a new 
Assembly with broader membership and broader powers, which has 
jurisdiction over the three Communities which are henceforth to work for a 
common objective: the economic integration of Europe.’ 
At the same time the quality of the information improved, as a result of the campaign 
waged by the Assembly/Parliament as described above50 aimed at achieving a degree of 
political/democratic control over the activities of the High Authority. 
The annex on the budgetary and financial aspects continued to develop in quantity and 
quality: In the 11th Report (1963), this annex was entitled ‘Budget and Finance’,  had an 
introduction and went into greater detail. In addition, that report refers to prior 
consultation of the parliamentary committees51 before the level of the levy was set. 
The 12th Report marks a step backward in terms of published information in the General 
Report: the text becomes drier and the members of the Assembly are referred to other 
financial documents, such as the report on administrative expenditure, the estimates on 
administrative expenditure and the report of the Official Auditor. 
The Assembly contested the content of that General Report, which it saw as being too 
technical and as missing the political element: as the control of the Assembly was mainly 
political, the content and approach of the Report should have been political as well. 
 
Critical positions of the Assembly  
The improvement in the quality of information was the result of the insistence of the 
parliamentary committees and of the Assembly as a whole vis-à-vis the High Authority. An 
example of this pressure is the discussion of the 11th Report, in which severe criticisms 
were made by the rapporteur Leemans, in particular: 
                                                                 
49 Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Community – Volume 1 - The Policy of the High Authority.  
50 See page 24. 
51 Eleventh General Report on the Activities of the Community – Volume II,  pp. 540-541. 
31
1. Lack of information on important issues; 
2. Quality of publications, seen as often being too detailed and at the same time 
lacking a global vision of the High Authority’s activities;  
3. Absence of proactive information. 
Members of the Common Assembly visiting a factory in Rome, November 1957. © European Union 
The High Authority was willing to improve the presentation of documents, but at the 
same time raised the problem of the organisation of the plenary, considering that the 
debates were too long with too many speeches and were not sufficiently focused on the 
political level52 - a problem which is identified even today by some Commissioners.  
 
The level of the levy over the years  
The High Authority fixed the first levy in January 1953 at 0.3 %, but raised it to 0.9 % that 
July. 
As a preliminary measure, the High Authority set up the levy office,53 with a ‘very small staff’ 
(no figures are mentioned in the General Report, however). At the end of 1952 the High 
Authority identified the enterprises subject to the levy 54. 
The first expenditure, as established by the Treaty, was administrative in nature, the aim 
being to recruit a staff to support the activities of the High Authority. Further expenditure 
                                                                 
52 Note from the Secretary-General of the High Authority, 3/9/1963, HAEU, CEAB 2 n 2405, p. 286. 
53 General Report,  April 1953, p. 114. 
54 574 mining enterprises and 434 iron and steel enterprises: the High Authority also appointed 20 banks to collect the 
levy. 
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went on reimbursing the Member States for the advance they had made to the ECSC and 
on financing the guarantee fund. 
Already in 1953 the High Authority had to face the problem of the German and Dutch 
industries having lower production costs than those in the other Member States. The 
solution55 found by the High Authority to this problem was to reduce the levy for those 
two countries, first to 1.1 % and then to 0.9 %56. The first ‘rebate’ was thus created. 
The budget for 1963 was also marked by another important decision: the High Authority 
decided to balance its books over a longer period instead of annually. To this end it 
provided for certain safeguards, enabling it either to reduce the burden of a given 
financial year or to increase revenue for that year, by transferring funds from previous to 
subsequent financial years.  
The High Authority thus endowed its budget with a multiannual perspective, with the 
possibility of carrying over the eventual surplus. 
A view of houses funded by the ECSC in Dudelange in 1956 for workers of Arbed (Aciéries Réunies de Burbach-Eich-
Dudelange). Between 1952 and 1958, 200 of these "ECSC houses" were built in Luxembourg, mainly in the municipalities 
of Esch-sur-Alzette, Dudelange and Schifflange.© Photothèque de la Ville de Luxembourg. Photograpie : Théo Mey. 
Lending activities  
In April 1954 the ECSC contracted its first loan, from the US government for USD 100 
million. This amount was spent on industrial investment (75 %) and workers’ housing 
                                                                 
55 Décision N° 1—53 du 7 février 1953 constituant la mise en place du mécanisme de péréquation et fixant les conditions 
d'assiette et de perception du prélèvement prévu à cet effet, OJ 1, 10.2.1953, p. 4–4. 
56 Décision N° 27—53 du 8 mars 1953 relative au montant et aux modalités d'application du prélèvement de péréquation 
prévu par la décision N° 1—53 du 7 février 1953, OJ 4, 13.3.1953, p. 84–85 and Décision N° 3-55 du 8 février 1955 relative 
au montant et aux modalités d'application du prélèvement de péréquation prévu par la décision N° 1-53 du 7 février 
1953, OJ 4, 8.2.1955, p. 617–618. 
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(25 %). The High Authority laid down the principles governing loans, which were not to 
replace the normal financing mechanisms and should not exceed 30 % of the global cost 
of a given investment 57. 
In 1954 and 1955 the High Authority raised five long-term loans (over 25 years) amounting 
to USD 117.5 million. Borrowing rose to USD 129 million in 1956. These sums were re-
loaned with no commission except bank charges of 0.25 %. The interest rates payable by 
the borrowers were much lower than those charged in most countries for similar loans. 
This policy has continued over the years.  
 
2. Concrete influence of the Assembly on budgetary issues 
The areas in which Parliament increased its influence having been indicated, we will now 
present some of the concrete cases.   
 
The levy 
The Assembly had no formal right of consultation on the level of the levy, but influence 
was gained over the years, after the episode in 1955 when members voiced their 
discontent at not being informed of the decision of the High Authority to reduce the levy. 
Following this incident, the Assembly was informed in advance and the High Authority 
was obliged to duly justify its decisions. 
In January 1956 the levy was fixed at 0.45 %58, and it was further reduced from July 1957 to 
0.35 %. This rate was maintained by the High Authority until June 1962. A large majority of 
the Budget and Finance Committee of the European Parliament59 opposed this decision, 
and the committee, by a large majority, declared itself in favour of a levy of 0.30 %. The 
High Authority then set the levy at precisely that rate60. This decision marks a step forward 
in the political influence of the European Parliament beyond the legal provisions of the 
Treaty. The level of the levy was fixed at 0.20 % in 1963. 
In other cases Parliament was less successful. In its resolutions and debates on the ECSC 
budget in 1976 and 1977, Parliament asked for the modification of the levy from 
production to transaction, thus calling for a higher levy on marketed products. As an 
alternative, Parliament suggested delaying the collection of the levy by a few months61. 
Commissioner Cheysson rejected this proposal, to avoid the risk that the delay in 
collection might affect the borrowing capacity of the ECSC. 
The calendar 
In May 1967, the Committee on Finances, Administration and Accounting presented a 
general report on Financial and budgetary questions of the ECSC 62: this report raised, inter 
alia, the problem of the timing of the consultation of Parliament on the level of the levy. It 
                                                                 
57 Third General Report, p. 132. 
58 The High Authority interpreted the Treaty rules literally and did not consult the Assembly.  For the Assembly’s reaction. 
59 See 10th General Report, 1962, p. 503. 
60 Report of the Committee on Budgets and Administration, doc. 32, 22.6.1961, EP Historical Archives PE0 AP 
RP/BUDG.1961 A0-0032/61 0001. 
61 Debate of the European Parliament on the ECSC levies and operational budget for 1977, 14 December 1976, pp. 72-74. 
62 Artzinger report, 24 May 1967, PE 17.479, HAEU, CEAB 1-1148, p. 210. 
concluded that the timing of the May and June plenaries was inadequate for an effective 
consultation of Parliament. An informal agreement was then concluded to consult the 
four competent parliamentary committees mandated to give an opinion on behalf of 
Parliament. The report expressed its satisfaction at the quality of the information provided 
by the High Authority. 
 
Own resources –  ECSC customs duties 
A very interesting case arose in the ECSC budget 1978, involving interinstitutional 
relations and own resources.  
The decision of 21 April 1970 on Community own resources did not cover coal and steel 
products, which were governed by the ECSC budget. Custom duties on ECSC products 
thus remained a matter for the Member States pending the adoption of a legal act to 
transfer those duties to the ECSC budget63.  
The 1978 ECSC budget had a deficit of about 32 million accounting units64. A majority in 
Parliament supported the Commission’s proposal for a special contribution from Member 
States to the ECSC budget. Alternatives discussed during the debate in plenary 65 included 
raising the levy from 0.29 % to 0.38 %. This option was, however, unanimously opposed 
owing to the crisis of the sector. Another option raised was transfer from the Community 
budget. An amendment was tabled by the Group of European Progressive Democrats, and 
a lively debate in plenary ensued (Cointat vs. Lange, PSE Group). Finally the plenary 
followed the rapporteur (Ripamonti, European People’s Party). 
The Commission and Parliament united to threaten the Council that it would bear the 
responsibility for an increase in the levy should the Commission’s proposal be rejected66. 
The Council failed to adopt the Commission proposal for a general transfer of coal and 
steel duties to the ECSC budget, but the Member States agreed on a ‘special contribution’ 
of 32 million accounting units and a supplementary transfer of 13 million accounting units 
from the EU budget. This allowed the financing of a number of subsequent budgets.  
The Member States refused to accept the proposal, but the pragmatic solution of a special 
contribution of the Member States was maintained. Parliament repeatedly 67 pointed out 
that the situation was most unsatisfactory and jeopardised the financial autonomy of the 
ECSC. 
With this ‘non-decision’, the Council took back some powers over the ECSC budget, with 
the tacit agreement of the High Authority (the latter could have raised the levy on its own 
initiative to a level not exceeding 1 % in order not to have to consult the Council). 
This sense of responsibility on the part of the High Authority suggested a more prudent 
and pragmatic approach to offering relief to the industry. 
 
                                                                 
63 Commission Aide-mémoire on the fixing of the ECSC levies on the drawing-up of the operational budget for 1978 - 
COM(77)0558, 10 November 1977. 
64 The accounting unit was used up to 1979 and followed the US dollar. 
65 Debates of the European Parliament, 13 December 1977, pp. 96-100. 
66 See COM(1977)0561 and COM(1978)0181 on transfer to the ECSC of customs duties on ECSC products.  
67 See report on the fixing of the ECSC levy rate, doc 1-704/80 (Hoff report) of 15 December 1980, EP Historical Archives 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 A1-0704/80 0010. 
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The Committee on Budgets68 
In January 1953 the Assembly set up a committee on the administration of the Assembly 
and the Community budget, referred as the Committee on Budgets. This committee 
consisted of 9 members. Its activity was marked by two major conflicts: 
• an ‘interinstitutional’ conflict with the Committee of Four Presidents, acting as 
budgetary authority: the Committee on Budgets claimed full autonomy regarding 
the budget, but it did not prove possible to formalise a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’;  
• an ‘internal’ conflict with the Committee of Presidents (equivalent to today’s EP 
Bureau) over organisation and requests for supplementary staff. 
The Committee on Budgets was responsible mainly for expenditure relating to the 
institutions and the organisation of the Assembly; responsibility for operating expenditure 
and investment was assigned to the Committee on Investment, Financial Matters and 
Long-Term Policy. 
 
3. The expiry of the Treaty and the consequences for the ECSC’s finances 
On 23 July  2002 the Treaty establishing the ECSC expired. Even if the event did not receive 
much media attention, the date will remain a memorable one in the History of Europe69: 
the ECSC Treaty represented the first attempt to create a Community and has shaped a 
model, with its limitations, which has been only partially followed. Under international law 
the founding member states could have easily prolonged its duration, but they chose not 
to.  
The Treaty expired on July 2002 but the ECSC did not actually die: its activities were 
integrated into the European Communities. Many have considered this integration as, in 
one scholar’s words, ‘merely an internal reorganisation of the EU apparatus and a 
redefinition of its tasks’70. 
The termination of the Treaty had consequences in many sectors (including competition 
and trade). Here we limit ourselves to describing those most closely linked to the financial 
arrangements, in particular integration into the EC budget, and the EP’s position on the 
matter. 
                                                                 
68 For an extensive description of the activities between 1953 and 1958 of the Committee on Budgets, see Piodi, The 
committees of the Common Assembly. 
69 A video of the ceremony (lowering of the flag and speech by the Commission President Romano Prodi) may be found 
at: http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/ceremony_to_mark_the_expiry_of_the_ecsc_treaty_brussels_23_july_2002-en-
5fc19504-48f9-4cba-adde-7ml  
70 Ubertazzi, Benedetta, The End of the ECSC, European Integration online Papers (EIoP,) Vol. 8 (2004), N° 20: 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm 
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The last formal session of the ECSC Consultative Committee in the Hemicycle of the Centre européen in Luxembourg, 
27 June 2002. © European Union 
The financial consequences 
The legal framework for the termination of the ECSC Treaty was set by a Protocol annexed 
to the Treaty of Nice on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty 71.  
The financial consequences concerned the operating budget and all ECSC assets (loans 
and borrowing); administrative expenditure was already integrated in the general budget, 
following the 1965 Treaty on the merger of the executives72.  
The principles set in the Protocol are simple: ‘All assets and liabilities of the ECSC, as they 
exist on 23 July 2002, shall be transferred to the European Community on 24 July 2002.’ 
The revenue from these assets, referred to as the ‘Research Fund for Coal and Steel’, is to 
be used exclusively for research, outside the research framework programme, in the 
sectors related to the coal and steel industry in accordance with the provisions of the 
Protocol and of acts adopted on the basis hereof. 
The total of these assets amounted to the equivalent of about EUR 820 million73. The 
revenue generated by the assets, following the terms of the Council decision 
implementing the Protocol 74, was referred to as the Research Fund for Coal and Steel.75 In 
                                                                 
71 OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, p. 67. 
72 See above, p. 25. 
73 This is the amount of reserves and surplus in the summary balance of the ECSC. According to the Commission the ex-
ECSC funds will probably total € 1.6 billion on 23 July 2002. 
74 OJ L 29, 5.2.2003, p. 22.  
75 European Commission, Monitoring and Assessment Report of the Research Programme for the Research Fund for Coal and 
Steel, Luxembourg, 2013, ISBN 978-92-79-29742-7. See also the website of the Fund at http://cordis.europa.eu/coal-steel-
rtd/  
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order to give security and continuity to the research, the revenue is entered in the budget 
two years after it is generated (i.e. revenue generated in the year n is entered in budget 
n+2). 
This solution, which was somehow inspired and approved by the Parliament, has been 
criticised (Nico Groenendijk and Gert-Jan Hospers, p. 609) 76 on the grounds that the 
decision constitutes an exception to the principle of unity of the budget, as research 
subsidies will be outside the general budget, and the principle of specificity, as those 
amounts are earmarked in advance. The authors raise doubts as well concerning the 
management capacity of the Commission to ensure long-term returns. 
Another important financial element is the liquidation of assets and liabilities existing at 
23 July 2002. According to the financial report, as at 31 December 201377  about 80 % of 
outstanding loans had been reimbursed and about 24 % of borrowing remained 
outstanding. We can conclude, more than 12 years after the end of the Treaty, that the 
liquidation is still ongoing, which is not surprising considering the long-term financial 
commitments which the High Authority had made to support coal and steel activities. 
 
Parliament’s contribution 
The EP accompanied, from the very beginning, the evolution of the ECSC and contributed 
to the establishment of a soft but growing influence on the Commission and also on the 
Council. 
Parliament felt concerned about the expiry of the Treaty and set the scene well in advance 
to indicate its approach on the subject. The Commission had already begun curbing ECSC 
financial activities in 1994. 
Own-initiative reports had already been tabled by the Committee on Budgets, in 199278, 
and in 199479 following a Commission communication80. 
Parliament wished to be involved in the discussions and influence the decisions. Even if 
the EP had no formal role to play in the phasing-out of the ECSC Treaty, it certainly had its 
say on the phasing-in aspect, i.e. the inclusion of the ECSC’s activities in the general 
budget. 
 
The resolutions – 1992 and 1994 
In 1992 Parliament had already given clear indications regarding the incorporation of the 
ECSC’s activities into the general budget, notably: 
                                                                 
76 Groenendijk, N. and Hospers, G.-J., Requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community (1952-2002), Economist-
Netherlands, 2002, Vol. 150(5), pp. 601-612, ISSN 0013-063X. 
77 Doc. C(2014)5215, 28 July 2014. 
78 EP resolution on the future of the ECSC Treaty - budgetary and financial consequences, adopted 9 July 1992, OJ C 241, 
21.9.1992, p. 182 (based on the report of the Committee on Budgets, A3-0248/92). 
79 EP resolution on the future of the ECSC Treaty, adopted 21 April 1994, OJ C 128, 9.5.1994, p. 368 (based on the report 
of the Committee on Budgets, A3-0223/94). 
80 Commission communication, 19 October 1993 -  COM(1993)0512/3, on the future of the ECSC Treaty. 
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(Extract from the EP resolution of 9 July 1992)  
It is Interesting to note that while the research, environmental and social aspects already 
had a budgetary structure which could easily be included in the general budget, the ideas 
around the possible evolution of the borrowing or lending operations were still imprecise, 
and Parliament suggested, at this stage, the transfer of those assets to the European 
Investment Bank. This choice was approved by a narrow majority; other MEPs supported 
the amendment proposed by the EPP to create a Foundation (Stiftung). The debate in 
plenary focused strongly on this point. In spite of the support of a number of German 
MEPs, the amendment was not adopted. 
However, the plenary unanimously adopted the request to reinforce the ceilings with a 
view to including the ECSC’s activities in the general budget: the resolution stated that 
‘appropriate budget reserves must be provided in the Community’s general budget to 
cover the transfer of activities from the ECSC to the EEC Treaty’ (paragraph 15). 
The EP resolution of 21 April 1994 stressed the need to accompany the phasing-out with a 
clear phasing-in structure, but concerning the borrowing and lending activities limited 
itself to calling on the Commission to ‘spell out its conclusions more clearly, both as 
regards cutting back on the activities and as regards their transfer or abolition’ (paragraph 
12). 
 
The resolutions – 1996  
The 1996 resolution81 indicated some principles for achieving a solution for the 
management of the assets: 
                                                                 
81 Adopted 15 November 1996 – OJ C 362, 2.12.1996, p. 327 - based on the  report of the Committee on Budgets (A4-
0302/1996). 
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Extract from the EP resolution of 15 November 1996 
In the following years, the Commission presented a coherent framework for the period 
after 23 July 2002, as well as three proposals which would form the basis of future 
decisions.82 
The resolutions – 2001  
On 2 October 2001 Parliament adopted a number of legislative amendments to the 
Commission proposals and, notably, a resolution83 setting out its final position on the 
arrangements post-2002. 
Parliament felt that the only ‘power’ it had in the matter was limited to administrative 
expenditure – included in the general budget since the entry into force of the Merger 
Treaty in 1965 in the general budget. Conversely, it felt it had ‘no say on any of the 
decisions to be taken on the guidelines of the future Coal and Steel Research Fund’ and 
considered that ‘passive role’ to be ‘contradictory to present-day requirements of 
transparency and accountability’, adding that ‘the legislative acts laying down the 
multiannual financial and technical guidelines of the Coal and Steel Research Fund should 
be brought under the codecision procedure, whereby the Parliament would decide on 
these guidelines on equal terms with the Council’ (para 1).   
Parliament went even further, threatening to block the whole process, pointing out that in 
fact Article 4(3) of the Financial Regulation requires the prior authorisation of Parliament 
and the Council before the Commission can accept a donation which might involve 
financial charges to the general budget ‘unless the multiannual guidelines of the Coal and 
Steel Research Fund are brought under codecision’ (para 2). 
The rapporteur in plenary called for further negotiations with a view to an acceptable 
agreement which would not exclude Parliament from better insight into the management 
of the activities linked to the ECSC.  
                                                                 
82 Commission proposal for a Council decision on establishing the measures necessary for the implementation of the 
Protocol, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the 
Research Fund for Coal and Steel (COM(2000)0519 and COM(2001)0121 - C5-0165/2001), OJ C 180,  26.6.2001, p. 4. See 
also: ‘Multiannual financial guidelines for managing the assets of the “ECSC in liquidation” and, on completion of the 
liquidation, the “Assets of the Coal and Steel Research Fund”‘ (COM(2000)0520 and COM(2001)0121 - C5-0166/2001), OJ 
C 180, 26.6.2001, p. 10). 
83 EP resolution of 2 October 2001, OJ C 87 E, 11.4.2002, p. 49, based on the report of the Committee on Budgets, A5-
0303/2001. 
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The joint declaration of 11 December 2001 
In the framework of the negotiations on the budget for 2002, Parliament’s requests were 
taken into consideration and a text was circulated by the Council Secretariat on the day of 
the budgetary conciliation84. On 11 December 2001 a joint declaration on budgetary 
information related to the management of the Fund and on the implementation of 
the research activities was adopted in plenary. 
On the subject of information, it was stated that the Budgetary Authority: 
• Will receive all information on operational expenditure and forecasts together with 
the preliminary draft budget; 
• Will budgetise on dedicated budget lines in revenue (1 for the earmarked revenue) 
and in expenditure (2 for coal research and 1 for steel research) in respect of 
specificity and transparency; 
• Will be informed of the administrative expenditure related to the management of 
the resource and expenditure budget lines of the Fund. 
 
Concerning the implementation of the research activities, the Commission undertook to 
make the following information available: 
• A list of research programmes financed by the Coal and Steel Research Fund, with 
participation rules and all relevant practical information; 
 
• The manual for the evaluation and selection of research actions submitted to the 
Fund; 
 
• The annual review of the activities carried out under the research programme 
financed by the Fund, and of the progress of the research work; 
 
• The final reports of the completed research projects financed by the Fund, 
comprising an assessment of exploitation and impact; 
 
• The reports on the five-year monitoring exercise of the research programme; 
 
• The assessment reports of the programme, including the benefits of research to 
society and the relevant sectors. 
 
To conclude once again, Parliament, even if in a legally weak situation, has succeeded in 
reinforcing its role in the post-ECSC arrangements. 
                                                                 
84 Draft proposal for a Joint Declaration concerning post-ECSC arrangements, EU Council General Secretariat, SN 4609/01 
rev. 1. 
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Workers' housing programme launched in 1954 aiming at comparing building costs in the European Community. In the 
picture: construction site in Ougrée near Liège. The picture was used in Nicolas Verschueren's thesis entitled Fermer les 
mines en construisant l’Europe : Une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne © Nicolas Verschueren 
 
 
45

ECSC 1952-2002 - reports quoted in the study85 
 
 
Reference code Title Rapporteur 
AC AP RP/REGL.1952 
AC-0001/53-janvier 
Règlement de l'Assemblée Commune MUTTER, André 
AC AP RP/ORGA.1952 
AC-0002/53-janvier
Composition et attributions des Commissions 
de l'Assemblée
PREUSKER, Victor 
Emanuel
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0004/53-mars 
État prévisionnel général de la Communauté 
(1953-1954 
VERMEYLEN, Pierre F. 
AC AP RP/RELA.1953 
AC-0005/54-
novembre 0010 
Les pouvoirs de contrôle de l'Assemblée 
Commune et leur exercice 
TEITGEN, Pierre-Henri 
AC AP RP/GRTR.1955 
AC-X001/55 
Le rôle et le fonctionnement des groupes 
politiques à l'Assemblée Commune (non 
achevé) 
FOHRMANN, Jean 
(groupe de travail) 
AC AP RP/GRTR.1955 
AC-0002/55-
novembre 
 
Organisation à donner à l'Assemblée Commune 
pour rentre plus efficace son action dans le 
cadre des dispositions actuelles du Traité 
POHER, Alain (groupe 
de travail) 
AC AP RP/SANI.1956 
AC-0038/57-juin 0010  
Sécurité et au sauvetage dans les mines BERTRAND, Alfred 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0032/61 
Questions budgétaires et financières de la CECA KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0072/67 
Quinzième Rapport d'activité de la CECA: 
questions financières et budgétaires 
ARTZINGER, Helmut K. 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0704/80 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1981 
HOFFMANN, Karl-
Heinz 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0248/92 
Budgetary and financial consequences of the 
future of the ECSC Treaty 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0223/94 
Future of the ECSC Treaty PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE4 AP RP/BUDG.1994 
A4-0302/96 
Incorporation of the ECSC in the Budget of the 
European Communities 
COLOM i NAVAL, Joan 
PE5 AP RP/BUDG.1999 
A5-0303/2001 
Expiry of the ECSC Treaty: Financial activities 
after 2002 
TURCHI, Franz 
 
 
ECSC 1952-2002 - other reports consulted on the ECSC budget 
 
 
Reference code Title Rapporteur 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0001/53-mars 
Projet d'état prévisionnel de l'Assemblée 
Commune pour l'exercice financier 1953-1954 
VERMEYLEN, Pierre F. 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0001/54-janvier 
Projet d'état prévisionnel de l'Assemblée 
Commune (1954-1955) 
SASSEN, E.M.J.A. 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0010/54-mai 
État prévisionnel général de la Communauté 
(1954-1955) 
SASSEN, E.M.J.A. 
                                                                 
85 No English version is available for documents produced before 1973. 
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 AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0003/54-
novembre 
Compte du deuxième exercice financier de 
l'Assemblée Commune (1er juillet 1953 - 30 juin 
1954) 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0001/54-
decembre 
Rapport du Commissaire aux comptes sur le 1er 
exercice financier 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
AC AP RP/INVE.1953 
AC-0010/55-mai 
Répartition du montant du prêt américain et 
autres questions du ressort de la Commission 
MENTHON, François de 
 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0011/55-mars
État prévisionnel général de l'Assemblée 
Commune pour l'exercice 1955/1956
KURTZ, Jozef
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0011/55-mai 
Projet d'état prévisionnel de l'Assemblée 
Commune (1955-1956) 
KURTZ, Jozef 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0020/55-mai 
État prévisionnel général pour l'exercice 
financier 1955-1956 
MARGUE, Nicolas 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0023/55-mai 
Situation des finances de la Communauté au 31 
décembre 1954 
BLANK, Martin 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0005/56-mars 
Projet d'État prévisionnel des dépenses de 
l'Assemblée Commune pour l'exercice financier 
1956-1957 
MARGUE, Nicolas 
AC AP RP/INVE.1953 
AC-0021/56-mai 
Politique financière et d'investissement (1955 - 
1956) 
MENTHON, François de 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0022/56-mai 
Contrôle des comptes de la Communauté 
(1954-1955) 
BLANK, Martin 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0023/56-mai 
Troisième rapport du Commissaire aux comptes 
(1954-1955) 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0024/56-mai 
État prévisionnel général des dépenses 
administratives de la Communauté (1956-1957) 
CHARLOT, Jean 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0005/56-
novembre 
Application de l'article 44, paragraphe 4 du 
Règlement 
BLANK, Martin 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0030/57-juin 
Quatrième rapport du Commissaire aux 
Comptes 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0031/57-juin 
Situation financière de la Communauté au 
cours du 4ème exercice 
BLANK, Martin 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0036/57-juin 
État prévisionnel général du budget de la 
Communauté pour le 6ème exercice financier 
(1957-58) 
CHARLOT, Jean 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0008/57-
novembre 
Compte des dépenses de l'AC pendant le 5e 
exercice financier 1956-1957 
CHARLOT, Jean 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0020/57-mai 
Projet d'état prévisionnel des dépenses 
administratives de l'Assemblée commune 
(1957-1958) 
JANSSEN, Marinus 
M.A.A. 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0013/58-fevrier 
Compte des dépenses de l'Assemblée 
Commune pendant le 5ème exercice financier 
(1956-1957) 
CHARLOT, Jean 
AC AP RP/BUDG.1953 
AC-0018/58-fevrier 
Projet d'état prévisionnel des dépenses 
administratives de l'Assemblée Commune 
(1958-1959) 
JANSSEN, Marinus 
M.A.A. 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1958 
A0-0009/58 
Dépenses administratives de la CECA 1956-1957 
et rapport du Commissaire aux Comptes 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
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PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1958 
A0-0010/58 
État prévisionnel des dépenses et des 
ressources de l'APE pour les années 1958 et 
1959 
JANSSEN, Marinus 
M.A.A. 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1958 
A0-0024/58 
Budget de la CECA pour l'exercice financier 
1958-1959 
CHARLOT, Jean 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1958 
A0-0044/59 
Questions budgétaires et financières de la CECA KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1958 
A0-0052/60 
Questions budgétaires et financières de la CECA VALS, Francis 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0053/62 
Dixième Rapport général d'activité CECA: 
questions budgétaire 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0083/62 
Règlement modifiant l'article 109 du statut des 
fonctionnaires de la CEE et de la CECA 
THORN, Gaston 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0038/63 
Rapport général de la CECA, 1963-
1964:questions budgétaires 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0064/63 
Projets de budget supplémentaires de la CEEA, 
CECA et CEE, 1963 
VALS, Francis 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0048/64 
Rapport d'activité de la CECA, 1964-1965: 
questions budgétaires et états prévisionnels 
KREYSSIG, Gerhard 
 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0036/65 
État prévisionnel rectificatif des dépenses 
administratives de la CECA, 1964-1965 
BERNASCONI, Jean 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0065/65 
Rapport d'activité de la CECA, 1965-1966: 
questions budgétaires 
BAAS, Jan 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1961 
A0-0079/66 
Quatorzième rapport d'activité de la CECA: 
questions budgétaires et taux de prélèvement 
BAAS, Jan 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0082/68 
Questions budgétaires et financières relatives à 
la CECA 
CORTERIER, Fritz 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0191/68 
Budget opérationnel et taux du prélèvement de 
la CECA, 1969 
ROSSI, André 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0109/69 
Rapport du commissaire aux comptes de la 
CECA, 1967 
CORTERIER, Fritz 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0196/69 
Budget opérationnel et taux du prélèvement de 
la CECA, 1970 
BOROCCO, Edmond 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0122/70 
Rapport du Commissaire aux comptes de la 
CECA, 1968 
GERLACH, Horst Bruno 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0228/70 
Budget opérationnel et taux du prélèvement de 
la CECA, 1971 
ROSSI, André 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0046/71 
Rapport du commissaire aux comptes de la 
CECA, 1969 
ROSSI, André 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0186/71 
Budget opérationnel et taux de prélèvement de 
la CECA, 1972 
BOROCCO, Edmond 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 
A0-0231/72 
Budget opérationnel et taux de prélèvement de 
la CECA, 1973 
AIGNER, Heinrich 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0078/73 
Report of the ECSC auditor for the financial year 
1970 
OFFROY, Raymond 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0209/73 
Reports of the ECSC auditor for the financial 
years 1971 and 1972 
ROSSI, André 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0269/73 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operating 
budget for 1974 
PISONI, Ferruccio 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0398/74 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operating 
budget for 1975 
LAGORCE, Pierre 
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PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0140/75 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1973 
AIGNER, Heinrich 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0437/75 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and  the operating 
budget for 1976 
BANGEMANN, Martin 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0550/75 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1974 
BRUGGER, Peter 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0476/76 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1977 
TERRENOIRE, Alain 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0567/76 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1975 
GERLACH, Horst Bruno 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0421/77 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1976 
BANGEMANN, Martin 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0439/77 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1978 
RIPAMONTI, Camillo 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0502/78 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1979 
SCHREIBER, Heinz 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0582/79 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1980 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0064/80 
Discharge to be given to the Commission of the 
European Communities in respect of the ECSC's 
financial and budgetary activities for the 
financial year 1977 and on the report of the 
Court of Auditors for the financial year 1977 
ANTONIOZZI, Dario 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0266/80 
Contributions to be granted to the European 
Coal and Steel Community out of the General 
Budget of the European Communities 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0839/81 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1982 
NORD, Hans R. 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0840/81 
Reports of the Court of Auditors on the financial 
and budgetary activities of the ECSC in the 
financial years 1978 and 1979 and the draft 
decision on the discharge in respect of these 
activities 
ANTONIOZZI, Dario 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0105/82 
Delays in the ECSC discharge procedure for the 
1980 financial year 
GABERT, Volkmar 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0313/82 
Contribution to the European Coal and Steel 
Community from the General Budget of the 
European Communities 
NORD, Hans R. 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0834/82 
Report of the Court of Auditors on the financial 
statements of the ECSC at 31 December 1980 
and the discharge to be granted to the 
Commission of the European Communities in 
respect of the ECSC accounts for the financial 
year 1980 
GABERT, Volkmar 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0959/82 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1983 
SCHÖN, Konrad 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0097/83 
Discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
financial statements of the ECSC for the 1981 
financial year and the report of the Court of 
Auditors on the accounts of the European Coal 
and Steel Community as at 31 December 1981 
GABERT, Volkmar 
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PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0140/75 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1973 
AIGNER, Heinrich 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0437/75 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and  the operating 
budget for 1976 
BANGEMANN, Martin 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0550/75 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1974 
BRUGGER, Peter 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0476/76 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1977 
TERRENOIRE, Alain 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0567/76 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1975 
GERLACH, Horst Bruno 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0421/77 
Report of the ECSC Auditor for the financial year 
1976 
BANGEMANN, Martin 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0439/77 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1978 
RIPAMONTI, Camillo 
PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 
A0-0502/78 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1979 
SCHREIBER, Heinz 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0582/79 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1980 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0064/80 
Discharge to be given to the Commission of the 
European Communities in respect of the ECSC's 
financial and budgetary activities for the 
financial year 1977 and on the report of the 
Court of Auditors for the financial year 1977 
ANTONIOZZI, Dario 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0266/80 
Contributions to be granted to the European 
Coal and Steel Community out of the General 
Budget of the European Communities 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0839/81 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1982 
NORD, Hans R. 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0840/81 
Reports of the Court of Auditors on the financial 
and budgetary activities of the ECSC in the 
financial years 1978 and 1979 and the draft 
decision on the discharge in respect of these 
activities 
ANTONIOZZI, Dario 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0105/82 
Delays in the ECSC discharge procedure for the 
1980 financial year 
GABERT, Volkmar 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0313/82 
Contribution to the European Coal and Steel 
Community from the General Budget of the 
European Communities 
NORD, Hans R. 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0834/82 
Report of the Court of Auditors on the financial 
statements of the ECSC at 31 December 1980 
and the discharge to be granted to the 
Commission of the European Communities in 
respect of the ECSC accounts for the financial 
year 1980 
GABERT, Volkmar 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0959/82 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1983 
SCHÖN, Konrad 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0097/83 
Discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
financial statements of the ECSC for the 1981 
financial year and the report of the Court of 
Auditors on the accounts of the European Coal 
and Steel Community as at 31 December 1981 
GABERT, Volkmar 
and the report of the Court of Auditors on ECSC 
housing loans  
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0464/83 
Financial activities of the ECSC GABERT, Volkmar 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0789/83 
Contribution to the European Coal and Steel 
Community out of the General Budget of the 
European Communities 
SCHÖN, Konrad 
PE1 AP RP/BUDG.1979 
A1-0948/83 
Fixing of the ECSC levies and the operational 
budget for 1984 
NEWTON DUNN, 
William Francis 
PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 
A1-0039/84 
Discharge to be granted to the commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1982 
GABERT, Volkmar 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-1143/84 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and on the drawing 
up of the ECSC operating budget for 1985 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-1802/84 
Discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1983. 
HÄRLIN, Benedikt 
PE2 AP RP/JURI.1984 
A2-0028/85 
Establishment of preferential treatment for 
debts in respect of the levies referred to in 
Articles 49 and 50 of the ECSC Treaty 
WIJSENBEEK, Florus A. 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0155/85 
Establishment, use and amount of the ECSC 
reserves 
HÄRLIN, Benedikt 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0177/85 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1986 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0014/86 
Deferral of the discharge to be granted to the 
Commission of the European Communities in 
respect of the ECSC accounts for the financial 
year 1984 
HÄRLIN, Benedikt 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0143/86 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1987 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0161/86 
Proposal for a decision on the discharge to be 
granted to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1984 
HÄRLIN, Benedikt 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0103/87 
Decision concerning the discharge to be 
granted to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the implementation 
of the ECSC operating budget for the financial 
year 1985 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0116/87 
Draft amending budget of the ECSC for 1987 BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0202/87 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1988 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/ECON.1984 
A2-0227/87 
I. Regulation instituting a Community 
programme to assist the conversion of steel 
areas (RESIDER programme); II. Decision 
concerning a contribution to the European Coal 
and Steel Community from the general budget 
of the European Communities to finance 
measures connected with the restructuring of 
the steel industry ; III. Conditional introduction 
of a new, three-year quota system, 
WAGNER, Manfred W. 
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incorporating plant closure incentives, in 
respect of certain products 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0008/88 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1986 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0127/88 
Aide-mémoire on the amendment of the 1988 
ECSC operating budget 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0309/88 
Contribution from the general budget of the 
Communities to the ECSC to finance social 
measures connected with the restructuring of 
the steel industry 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0311/88 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1989 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0022/89 
Proposal for a decision concerning the 
discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1987 
(Annex of the Court of Auditors to the 1987 
ECSC Annual Report) 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0094/89 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1990 
SAMLAND, Detlev 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0161/89 
Draft ECSC supplementary and amending 
budget for 1989 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0071/90 
Discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1988 
(Annex of the Court of Auditors to the 1988 
ECSC Annual Report) 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0348/90 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1991 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0002/91 
Community policy concerning ECSC, Euratom 
and NCI loans and borrowings 
SARIDAKIS, Georgios 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0052/91 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1989 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0268/91 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1991 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0361/91 
Draft ECSC operating budget for 1992 PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0089/92 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1990 
BLAK, Freddy 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0274/93 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1993 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0320/92 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1992 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0415/92 
Draft ECSC operating budget for 1993 PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0101/93 
Postponement of the discharge to be given to 
the Commission in respect of the management 
of the ECSC for the 1991 financial year 
BLAK, Freddy 
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incorporating plant closure incentives, in 
respect of certain products 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0008/88 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1986 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0127/88 
Aide-mémoire on the amendment of the 1988 
ECSC operating budget 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0309/88 
Contribution from the general budget of the 
Communities to the ECSC to finance social 
measures connected with the restructuring of 
the steel industry 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0311/88 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1989 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 
A2-0022/89 
Proposal for a decision concerning the 
discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1987 
(Annex of the Court of Auditors to the 1987 
ECSC Annual Report) 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0094/89 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1990 
SAMLAND, Detlev 
PE2 AP RP/BUDG.1984 
A2-0161/89 
Draft ECSC supplementary and amending 
budget for 1989 
BARDONG, Otto 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0071/90 
Discharge to be granted to the Commission of 
the European Communities in respect of the 
ECSC accounts for the financial year 1988 
(Annex of the Court of Auditors to the 1988 
ECSC Annual Report) 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0348/90 
Fixing of the ECSC levy rate and the drawing up 
of the ECSC operating budget for 1991 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0002/91 
Community policy concerning ECSC, Euratom 
and NCI loans and borrowings 
SARIDAKIS, Georgios 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0052/91 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1989 
HOFF, Magdalene 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0268/91 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1991 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0361/91 
Draft ECSC operating budget for 1992 PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0089/92 
Discharge to the Commission of the European 
Communities in respect of the ECSC accounts 
for the financial year 1990 
BLAK, Freddy 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0274/93 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1993 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0320/92 
Draft amending ECSC operating budget for 
1992 
PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1989 
A3-0415/92 
Draft ECSC operating budget for 1993 PASTY, Jean-Claude 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0101/93 
Postponement of the discharge to be given to 
the Commission in respect of the management 
of the ECSC for the 1991 financial year 
BLAK, Freddy 
PE3 AP RP/CONT.1989 
A3-0258/93 
Discharge to the Commission in respect of the 
management of the ECSC for the 1991 financial 
year 
BLAK, Freddy 
PE3 AP RP/ECON.1989 
A3-0403/93 
Towards greater competitiveness in the steel 
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